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Abstract 
Our knowledge of the factors that affect safety and performance in complex system becomes 
outdated as the domain evolves. Increased activity and complexity in maritime offshore 
operations requires that we update our knowledge on which factors that affects safety and 
performance in these complex systems. The purpose of this study was to examine to which 
degree a model of expertise and a model of safety climate were sensitive to account for 
interview statements from operative marine officers regarding work practices in demanding 
maritime operation. Semi-structured interviews were conducted on 10 marine officers from 
anchor handling and tug support vessels (AHTS) and platform supply vessels (PSV). Based 
on an M-SWOT approach, statements were coded into the categories of each model. The 
results revealed that neither a model of expertise nor safety climate could alone account for all 
statements. Together, the chosen models could together account for 61.9 % of the total of 
1947 identified statements. Qualitative analysis of the statements not accounted for by either 
models revealed several meaningful themes regarding work in demanding operations. The 
results demonstrate a useful insight to the complexity of working in demanding maritime 
operations and can provide several starting points for further research.  
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Expertise or Safety Climate? Approaching Human Factors in Demanding Maritime 
Operations. 
After 40 years of successful petroleum industry in Norway it is still expected much 
activity on the Norwegian continental shelf in the years to come. However, there are many 
signs of increasing complexity in production (Forskningsrådet, 2010). Recent oil and gas 
discoveries have been relatively small, and it is expected extraction from many small-scale 
fields in distant areas. Production on deep water and exploration of the northern areas will 
require complex subsea operations and challenges related to cold climate and ice. All these 
aspects will require demanding surface activities and several more anchor handling and tug 
support vessels (AHTS), more platform supply vessels (PSV), and more specialized 
construction vessels (Maritim21, 2010).  
On April 12, 2007, the multi-purpose / anchor handling vessel Bourbon Dolphin 
capsized northwest of Shetland during an anchor handling operation. Eight lives were lost. 
The accident report revealed that no single cause could alone explain why this accident was 
allowed to happen (NOU, 2008: 8). The accident investigation board identified a whole range 
of undesirable circumstances, from breaches of safety requirements to lack of qualification 
and experience of the crew. These issues will continue to exist on new vessels unless 
something is done. 
The Bourbon Dolphin accident illustrates the complexity of operating an offshore 
support vessel. The accident report argued that there is by no means shortage of written 
materials, both obligatory and advisory, to remain safe. Existing safety measures have clearly 
failed in the Bourbon Dolphin case, and may thus be seen as a more general feature of safety 
issues in current oil and gas industries – that our knowledge has not been sufficiently 
developed as the field has evolved.  
The fact is that the maritime industry depends upon experienced and competent 
personnel to be able to perform safely and efficiently in complex operations in the future. 
Meanwhile, an increasing complexity in production as well as the highly sophisticated ships 
will continuously change the way mariners cope and deal with the demands presented to them 
(Perrow, 1986). Rapid change in equipment and technological interfaces can in fact make it 
even harder for mariners to operate safely (Bjørkli, 2007; Koester, 2001; Lützhöft, 2004). 
Lack of sufficient understanding of how mariners perceive their work and cope with the 
challenges presented to them will leave the industry less capable to adjust to ensure safe and 
efficient operations in the future as suggested in the Bourbon Dolphin accident report.  
	   	   	  3	  
In the following I will present some of the challenges related to studying work in complex 
industries, and then turn to discuss some issues concerning the maritime domain. Furthermore 
I will debate two perspectives towards understanding the role of the human element in 
complex maritime operations.  
 
Coping with Complexity – Working in Complex Sociotechnical Systems 
The human factors discipline studies the intersection between people, technology and 
work (Wichkens, Lee, Liu, & Becker, 2004). When this intersection becomes profoundly 
complex, as it tends to do for high-risk industries such as offshore installations, nuclear power 
plants, aviation, and health care, they are identified as complex sociotechnical systems 
(Norros, 2004; Vicente, 2004). Such systems make it possible to control and coordinate large 
resources, but make them also vulnerable to catastrophic accidents if things go wrong. In a 
complex sociotechnical system, performance and safety depends upon constant interaction 
between people and their work environment, i.e. environmental context, the organizational 
infrastructure and the equipment they use (See for instance Bjørkli, Røed, Bjelland, Gould, & 
Hoff, 2007). 
The shipping industry is without doubt a complex sociotechnical system, and maritime 
accidents can have potentially devastating consequences (Hetherington, Flin, & Mearns, 
2006; Perrow, 1999). The factors that contribute to the complexity of such systems vary, but 
Vicente (1999) lists a set of dimensions broad enough to subsume most of them. Table 1 lists 
the dimensions given by Vicente, in addition to some remarks relevant for the offshore 
maritime domain.  
As showed in Table 1, there are several dimensions relevant for operating a marine 
vessel. The increasing complexity of maritime offshore operations poses unique challenges to 
the people involved in the design, implementation and maintenance of these systems, but 
equally important concerns challenges related to the people working there (Carayon, 2006). 
As work becomes more complex, so do also the task of keeping the system within its limits 
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Table 1: Complexity of work systems as presented by Vicente (1999, p. 14) 
Dimensions of complexity Definition Maritime relevance 
Large problem spaces Many different elements and forces Weather, underwater stream, 
other vessels, etc 
Social Many people who must work 
together 
Officers, deck crew, 
engineers 
Heterogeneous perspectives Workers with different background 
and disciplines 
Multinational crew, 
experience from different 
vessels 
Distributed system Delay in effects of actions 
 
Maneuvering and handling 
Hazardous system Devastating economic, public, social 
and environmental consequences 
Marine accidents and 
incidents 
Coupling Interacting subsystems Dynamic positioning, 
operator, engine, crew on 
deck etc. 
Automation Automated systems Autopilot, dynamic 
positioning, technical 
equipment 
Uncertainty Uncertainty in data available to 
workers 
Weather, Imperfect sensors, 
economical drivers 
Mediated interaction Properties that cannot be directly 
observed 
Activities beneath surface, 
competing companies 
Disturbances Workers dealing with unanticipated 
events 
Sudden change in weather 
conditions, engine failure 
 
Ensuring Safety and Efficiency – A Matter of Multiple Perspectives 
As noted above, human factors studies the intersection between people, technology 
and work. However, in complex systems, one is also concerned with cross-scale interactions 
between what Woods and Hollnagel (2006) term the sharp end and the blunt end of an 
organization. Within a shipping company, the sharp end consist of the people working close 
to the actual production, in this case the crew on a ship, while the blunt end is represented by 
the regulators, administrators, economic policy makers, and technology suppliers.  
The interactions between different parts of a complex system highlight the problem of 
risk modeling in dynamic systems as argued by Rasmussen (1997). Rasmussen holds that the 
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problem space for complex sociotechnical systems expands far beyond the organization and 
its immediate environment. Forces that affect system performance and safety stretches from 
the society’s rules and regulations at the top, down to the smallest equipment used by 
operators.  
For those concerned with making systems safer and more reliable, these cross scale 
interactions presents a central challenge. How do we identify and isolate the operational 
organization, and furthermore which unit of analysis would bring relevant knowledge of 
current affairs? Perrow (1999) pointed out that the role of humans always has been a critical 
component aboard ships. The international maritime organization (IMO) states that life at sea 
is highly dependent on competent seafarers (IMO, 2010). However, human behavior is 
constantly affected by their technical equipment and several organizational factors such as 
commercial pressure, rules, international regulations and the effects of organizational culture 
(Barnett, Gatfield, & Pekcan, 2003; Trafford, 2009). As a result, the potential units of analysis 
could be a whole range of different sources, varying from issues connected to humans at the 
one side to higher order organizational issues on the other. A consequence of the various 
starting points is that there is no agreement over which unit of analysis that is most profitable 
and researchers have to choose wisely. In line with the increasing complexity in the maritime 
offshore industry, what would be a valuable starting point in a marine context? 
 
Human Factors in The Maritime Industry  
Ship navigation involves a high degree of uncertainty, dynamism and complexity 
(Norros, 2004). Consequently, the factors that affect safety and performance can be various. 
Gould, Røed, Koefoed, Bridger and Moen (2006) examined 35 navigation accident in the 
Royal Norwegian Navy with the aim at identifying factors that influenced the likelihood of an 
error occurring, also called performing shaping factors (PSF). From the 35 accidents they 
identified in total 644 PFS. Furthermore, they made a categorization between PFSs that 
included characteristics of humans, the task, the system, and the environment. This 
categorization presents a useful insight in some of the main sources of performance variability 
in naval operations. Within a context of assessing safety and performance, each category 
could be a fine starting point to start identifying units of analysis. However, naval operations 
are more isolated from the market forces than commercial shipping. Hence, it might be a 
different picture in commercial shipping. 
Hetherington et al. (2006) conducted a review of 20 various shipping accidents and 
showed that these accidents also were a matter of multiple factors. Much similar to how 
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Gould et al. (2006) categorized the different PFSs, Hetherington and colleagues made a 
conceptual distinction between organizational-, personnel-, and design issues that contributed 
to accidents, and furthermore also reviewed the most common interventions to make shipping 
safer in relation to this distinction. Figure 1 presents an illustration of the identified issues. 
Figure 1: An organizing framework for human factors issues that contribute to   
organizational accidents in shipping. Inspired from Hetherington, Flin, and Mearns  
(2006). 
 
The conceptual distinction between organizational, personnel and technical issues, as 
illustrated in Figure 1 makes some basic assumptions about where the sources of variability 
and stability exist in a complex system, and furthermore which means that can be taken to 
obtain better knowledge of these issues. From an organizational perspective, opponents for 
studying safety climate, for instance, will claim that the management’s attitude and behavior 
towards safety will permeate down trough the organization to the workforce (Guldenmund, 
2000). Using measures of safety climate on people working at the sharp end can therefore say 
something about how the organization is currently thinking about safety and furthermore give 
some indications on which areas that could receive more attention.  
On the other hand, personnel factors such as stress or mental workload could say 
something about the crew’s ability to accomplish their work under given circumstances. 
Gould et al. (2006) found for instance that the most frequently occurring PSF in naval 
accidents were related to operator expectation, perceptual demands, attention, and 
anticipatory requirements. Hence, gathering knowledge of such factors could give researchers 
some clues of how personnel are reacting to the work demands that is presented to them.  
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Another way of approaching cognitive limitations can be from a technical point of 
view that focus on designing better automation equipment and adapt advanced technology to 
the user. An increase in automation equipment, such as navigation, has among other things 
changed the manning requirements on modern vessels and has made a huge impact on the 
way the crew work on a daily basis (Røed, 2007) Due to the scope of this study, I will not go 
further in discussing design issues. For an elaboration of these matters, see for instance 
Woods (1998). In the following I will focus on the intervention of personnel and 
organizational issues, and furthermore discuss some perspectives of how these issues are 
studied in the maritime domain. 
 
Personnel issues – Identifying Aspects of Human Performance 
As shown in Figure 1 and from the study of Gould et al. (2006), personnel issues in 
the maritime domain can be examined trough a wide range of different approaches. In the 
end, a personnel-centered approach attempts to identify and explain which conditions the 
crew is performing well. A common feature of these issues is that they tend to be quite 
specific. An alternative approach would be to look at a framework that could account for 
several human performance characteristics at once. To do this, we could turn to the area of 
expertise.  
The concept of expertise is a concept much discussed by human factors practitioners, 
either implicitly or explicitly, through for instance in relation to analysis of human 
performance, task analysis, human reliability analysis, in studies of learning and training, and 
in development of expert systems (such as automation) (Charness & Tuffiash, 2008; 
Farrington-Darby & Wilson, 2006). Understanding the characteristics of expert performance 
is therefore central to both design of new work systems as well as how to train and develop 
competent people.  
 
What is Expertise?  
According to Farrington-Darby and Wilson (2006), expertise can refer to description 
of skills, knowledge or abilities in a certain activity; a process such as decision-making; or it 
can refer to an output such as a decision. Expertise focus at the characteristics that distinguish 
experts from novices and an expert can be defined as someone who over time show superior 
performance in a domain (Ericsson, 2006b; Gruber, 2001). The knowledge of experts is 
therefore a valuable source of information into what is relevant or necessary to achieve 
performance. The problem with expert models, however, is that they tend to be very domain 
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specific (Cellier, Eyrolle, & Marine, 1997; Gruber, 2001). As a consequence it is practically 
impossible to provide a consensual and operational definition of what an expert is, what they 
know, and how they cope with their respective operational tasks. Three of the most 
representative domains that have seen extensive research the past few decades are in sports, 
aviation, and medicine (For a further discussion, see Charness & Tuffiash, 2008).  
The area of expertise is a large and complex research area. The scope of this study 
does not give room for a comprehensive overview of the various concepts, definitions and 
models of expertise. For an extensive approach, see for instance Ericsson, Charness, Fetlovich 
and Hoffman (2006). However, to get a substantial picture of the relevance of expert theory 
for this study, a description of the difference between identification and development of 
expert performance is needed. In the following I will give an account for this difference and 
then turn to present a framework that can be used as an explorative approach towards 
assessing expert characteristics for crew operating in the maritime domain.  
 
Description and Development of Expert Performance 
A great deal of research on expertise has been inspired from the cognitive science 
tradition which holds that experts are skilled, competent and think qualitatively different than 
novices. This is also the case for the decision-making literature that searches to identify how 
experts reason differently from novices (See for instance Klein, 1998). As a consequence, 
expert theories have focused on skill acquisition with little regard for the domain or 
contextual factors that affect expertise development (Grenier & Kehrhahn, 2008). The 
literature that focus on linear stages of expertise may help researchers identify expertise, but 
do not necessarily help them understand how expertise develops or how it is maintained 
(Grenier & Kehrhahn, 2008). In an ever-changing work environment, this development is of 
great interest. 
In dynamic environments, such as on a marine vessel, the state of the process can 
change irrespective of operator action. One way of studying the skills and knowledge 
involved in controlling a dynamic task is therefore to make experimental research and 
compare operators with various levels of expertise (Cellier et al., 1997). Expert – novice 
experiments have however received some criticism as a method since it is essential that one 
knows what kind of activities that occur naturally in the relevant domain (Ericsson, 2006a)  In 
a dynamic environment, this is close to impossible to predict. An alternative approach would 
be to look for those characteristics experts hold across different domains. Shanteau (1992) 
claimed to have identified such characteristics.   
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Psychological Characteristics of Experts 
Shanteau (1992) point out that expertise is not a fixed state to be attained, but a 
continuous process of learning, experimenting, and reflecting in response to changes in 
contextual forces. He furthermore argues that the environment in which expertise is enacted 
has some influence over its identification and development. This view is in line with Grenier 
and Kehrhah (2008), who sympathize with the literature that signify the critical relationship 
between domain and expertise.  
Shanteau (1992) claims that his view differs from the cognitive science tradition, 
which holds that experts are skilled, competent, and think qualitatively different from novices. 
He argues that the skills and abilities that emerge (or do not emerge) depend on the situation 
they work in. However, based on his research, Shanteau claims that he has been able to 
identify 10 characteristics and seven strategies that characterize experts across different 
domains. These are:  
 
Characteristics: 1) Extensive and up to date knowledge, 2) highly developed 
perceptual/attentional abilities, 3) sense of what is relevant when making decisions, 4) 
ability to simplify complex problems, 5) ability to communicate, 6) handle adversity 
better, 7) better at identify and adapt to exceptions, 8) self confidence, 9) adapt 
decision strategies to changing task conditions, 10) strong sense of responsibility and 
willingness to stand behind their recommendations. 
Strategies: 1) Willingness to make continuous adjustment, 2) get help from others to 
make better decisions, 3) make use of formal or informal decision aids, 4) make small 
errors to avoid making large mistakes, 5) operate as though coming close is good 
enough, 6) follow some sort of divide and conquer strategy, 7) break problems down.  
 
The observant reader may notice that Shanteau’s framework also highlights some 
social elements of expertise, such as communication and sense of responsibility. These 
dimensions have gained much attention in recent years due to the acceptance that modern 
work requires an integration of both cognitive and social skills (Farrington-Darby & Wilson, 
2006). The maritime industry has for instance increased focus on non-technical skills trough 
training in simulation and crew resource management (CRM), or bridge resource management 
(BRM) (Barnett et al., 2003; Salas, Wilson, Burke, & Wightman, 2006). 
Shanteau’s framework is an extensive set of factors, which also makes it a good 
starting point for an explorative study in the maritime domain. Expert characteristics in 
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marine operations seem to be an absent topic in current research literature. For organizational 
issues, on the other hand, there exists a more familiar subject, namely safety culture and 
safety climate. 
  
Organizational issues – Safety culture and safety climate 
Within the maritime domain, the notion of safety culture gained more attention after 
implementing the International Safety Management code in 1994 (Trafford, 2009). The idea 
of safety culture evolves from the interest at gathering information of why certain norms and 
attitudes towards behavior exist (Guldenmund, 2000). Safety culture is important because it 
forms the context within which individual’s safety attitudes develop. In spite of its obvious 
relevance, investigators in the maritime domain has given safety culture relatively little 
attention (Barnett et al., 2003), but recent studies shows an increasing interest for these issues 
(see for instance Håvold, 2010; Oltedal and Wadsworh, 2010). 
 
What is Safety Climate?  
According to Flin and colleagues (2000) safety climate can be regarded as “the surface 
features of the safety culture discerned from the workforce’s attitude and perceptions at a 
given point of time” (p. 178). Safety climate is in other words a manifestation of safety culture 
in the behavior and expressed attitude of employees at a given point of time. It is becoming 
accepted that a favorable safety climate is essential for safe operation. Furthermore, the 
relationship between safety climate and performance is a central component in complex 
systems. A ship’s staff, for instance, is constantly focusing on safety, not only because of the 
risk of injuries, but also in terms of fiscal drivers form the industry in the sense that ships 
often are chartered on the strength of their safety performance (Hetherington et al., 2006). 
Questionnaires of safety climate can therefore be used to determine the importance of safety 
within an organization, or identify areas that require further attention. 
Safety climate is usually measured trough a questionnaire survey with the purpose of 
gathering scores on a series of thematic dimensions that tap into people’s evaluation of 
various aspects considered to be relevant for safety (Guldenmund, 2007). It is often the 
researcher that chooses which dimensions that are relevant to measure. There has, however, 
been some dispute about the value of using such questionnaires when measuring safety 
climate. Guldenmund (2007) argues that the use of questionnaires does not successfully 
expose the core of an organizational safety culture, as it merely invites respondents to simply 
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espouse rationalizations of safety climate. As a result you are stuck with a set of factors and 
scores and not knowing what they actually mean or imply.  
 
Testing the Applicability of a Generic Model of Safety Climate in Demanding Maritime 
Operations 
Flin and colleagues (2000) conducted a review where they searched through 18 
published reports on safety climate used in various industrial sectors in search for a generic 
structure of safety climate. They concluded with a six-dimension structure, consisting of: 1) 
management commitment, 2) safety system, 3) risk, 4) work pressure, 5) competence, 6) 
procedure / rules. In addition, they brought up the dimension blame and organizational 
learning. A further specification of the dimensions is presented in the methods section.  
These eight dimensions, from now on referred to as the safety climate model (SCM), have 
previously been validated through qualitative interviews and found relevant for the maritime 
domain (Imset, 2008; Salvesen, 2008). However, although SCM is found relevant for the 
maritime domain, this does not necessarily entail that it can account for the same aspects 
connected to carrying out complex maritime offshore operations.  
 
Assessing Safety and Efficiency Issues in Maritime offshore operations: Personnel issues 
vs. Organizational issues  
In summary, human factors practitioners interested in understanding various elements 
that affect system safety and performance in complex systems, are guided by several implicit 
and explicit assumptions of where variability and stability in a system can be identified and 
furthermore which approaches that are best suited for assessing these issues. As showed in the 
studies of Gould et al. (2006) and Hetheringthon et al. (2006), there are several factors 
influencing maritime safety, being both individual oriented and organizational oriented. 
Equally important, these studies reveal that it is of little value to distinguish elements that are 
casual or contributing causes.  
There is surprisingly little relevant human factors research that discusses the 
discriminate sensitivity of different approaches. Needless to say though, all perspectives are 
important. However, in an industry where time is a deficiency, it is of great value to assess 
knowledge that could tell something about their immediate relevance and/or their possibly 
overlapping features. As Woods and Dekker (2000) emphasized over ten years ago, there is 
an enormous need for human factors practitioners to develop techniques and models that can 
generate knowledge of human performance in dynamic work.  
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This study will therefore examine to which extent two generic models from 
respectively a personnel-centered approach, with a model of expertise, and an organizational 
centered approach, with a model of safety climate, account for the same topics that 




The main purpose of this study is to empirically test whether a model of safety climate 
or a model of expertise is more sensitive at capturing statements from operating marine 
officers regarding work practices in demanding maritime operations. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted on experienced offshore marine officers to gather reflections 
towards their way of work during demanding maritime operations. The interviews were 
structured in a SWOT framework, which aims at identifying current strengths and 
weaknesses, and future opportunities and threats about the subject matter. SWOT interviews 
are open and do not guide participants in any direction. This method is therefore helpful in 
exploring a general topic.  
Based on the discussion above, both personnel-related- and organizational-related 
approaches make some assumptions about what to look for when gathering relevant data in 
relation to how work is carried out. A generic model of expert characteristics is meant to 
account for high performance among individuals. Shanteau (1992) claimed that his 
framework should be valid across different domains. If Shanteau’s framework account for the 
same topics that the crew find significant in relation to their way of work, then this model 
should account for the majority of statements generated from the interviews. The following 
hypothesis will test this notion:  
 
Hypothesis 1) There will be no significant differences between number of identified 
statements in total and the number of statements accounted for in the model of expert 
characteristics by Shanteau (1992).  
On the other side, an organizational-centered approach such as safety climate should 
be sensitive at capturing the manifestation of safety culture in the behavior and expressed 
attitude of employees. SCM by Flin (2000) have earlier been validated trough SWOT 
interviews and found relevant for the maritime domain (Imset, 2008; Salvesen, 2008). If SCM 
is a sensitive measure for how officers perceives and reflects about their work in demanding 
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maritime operations, then SCM is expected to account for all statements regarding work 
practice in demanding maritime operations. Hypothesis 2 will test this notion: 
Hypothesis 2) There will be no significant differences between number of identified 
statements in total and the number of statements accounted for by safety climate model 
by Flin et al. (2000). 
As discussed above, work in complex system involves many cross-scale interactions 
between the different components in a sociotechnical system (Rasmussen, 1997). It may 
therefore be that a cross-disciplinary organizational-centered approach combined with a 
personnel-centered approach would give the best picture of how officers reflect upon their 
way of work. The following hypothesis will test this notion: 
Hypothesis 3: There will be no significant differences between number of identified 
statements in total and number of statements accounted for by both model of expert 
characteristics and safety climate model together 
Following the rationale behind hypothesis 1, 2 and 3, it is expected that statements not 
accounted for by either PCE or SCM will be redundant information. The following hypothesis 
will test this notion.  
Hypothesis 4: Residual statements not accounted for by either a model of expertise 
and safety climate is not relevant for how work is carried out in demanding maritime 
operations.  
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Method 
The Research Project 
This study was a part of a long-term project between the department of work and 
organizational psychology at the University of Oslo (UiO) and maritime studies at Vestfold 
University College. These departments are currently involved, together with Kongsberg 
Maritime, and Chalmers University, in an innovation project called SIMAR (simulation of 
demanding maritime operations). The project is founded by the research Council of Norway 
from 2010 until 2013, with the aim of improve simulation training by enhancing focus on 
human factors.  
 
Recruiting Participants 
Offshore support vessels are considered demanding to operate (NOU, 2008: 8) Hence, 
the targeted group for this study was officers working at offshore vessels, primarily officers at 
anchor handling tug support vessels (AHTS), and officers at platform supply vessels (PSV). 
These vessels are for the most time at sea, and have unpredictable scheduling for when and 
where they are expected to be ashore. Recruiting participants was therefore depended upon 
close cooperation with offshore shipping companies in addition to maritime training facilities. 
Shipping Companies. Six of the largest offshore shipping companies in Norway were 
contacted. A written information letter followed up every request by e-mail. Two shipping 
companies had available resources to follow up the request. With regard to confidentiality, the 
names of the companies are not cited. One shipping company sent us contact information to 
the near by vessels who expected to go ashore in the nearest future. It was important that the 
captain agreed upon this arrangement. The captains of these vessels were contacted and 
received the general information letter (Appendix A) in addition to the information letter for 
participants (Appendix B). The captain was asked to inform the officers onboard about the 
project. Participation was voluntary. Although several vessels were willing to assist the 
project, only two vessels at various locations along the coast of Norway were visited. Tight 
schedules and long travel distances made it difficult to arrange meetings. In sum, six 
participants were interviewed this way.  
The second shipping company contacted their officers through their internal channels. 
One captain showed interest in participating and responded to the request, and a meeting was 
arranged.  
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Training facility. One training facility was contacted and asked to forward the request 
to AHTS officers participating in a training program. Three captains had available time and 
agreed to participate. A meeting was soon after arranged at the training facility.  
Sample. In sum, ten officers were recruited. Six of these were master chiefs (captains), 
two had the rank chief officers, and two participants had the rank second officer. Seven of the 
officers were working on AHTS-vessels, and three (one of each rank) from PSV-vessels. 
Between them they had over 200 years of shipping experience, ranging from eight to 45 years 
(SD = 8.8). All participants were male. Mean age was 40 years (SD = 8.9). One participant 
had national origin from Brazil; the remaining nine was Norwegian. 
 
The Interviews 
The purpose of conducting interviews was to obtain officers reflection upon work 
practices in demanding maritime operations. Hence, in order to maximize the amount of 
information gathered from participants, semi-structured interviews were seen as the most 
appropriate method. The interviews were based on a SWOT-frame (Helms & Nixon, 2010; 
Hoff, 2009). SWOT is an acronym for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, and 
is well-known framework from its popularity as a strategy tool for organizational 
development, but can also be applied to individuals (Helms & Nixon, 2010). SWOT-
interviews are helpful in exploring a general topic, and are a suited framework to guide an 
interview (Hoff, 2009).  
The objective of the SWOT-interviews was to give officers the opportunity to freely 
reflect and explain what they saw as strengths and weaknesses in their current work practice 
in demanding maritime operations, and further what could be future possibilities and threats 
towards the way they worked in demanding operations. Since the topic “demanding maritime 
operations” can be widely understood, the first interview-question asked them to explain what 
they think demanding maritime operations is all about, pinpointing the theme for the rest of 
the interview. In addition to the five main interview questions, some follow up questions such 
as: “you said…can you please elaborate?” was used to gain more insight and better 
understanding of the themes brought up (Kvale, 1996).  
 
Procedure 
Preparations: As in all qualitative research, is critical to acknowledge that the 
researcher is the primary research tool. Preparation and training is therefore critical to ensure 
validity and reliability in all stages of the process, from the interview (Kvale, 1996) to 
	   	   	  16	  
transcribing and analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Krippendorff, 2004). The author, who 
conducted all interviews, had participated in a 35-hour preparatory interview course with 
professor Roald Bjørklund (UiO) based on the PEACE-model (Clarke & Milne, 2001). The 
course was specifically aimed at training for SWOT-interviews. In addition, the author had 
experience as a research assistant in similar studies and was well trained for the interview 
situation.  
Carrying out the interviews: The interviews were conducted in the period from 
October to December 2010. Six of the interviews were conducted on the vessels where the 
participant normally worked. The remaining four were conducted in a meeting room wherever 
the participant was available. All interviews where conducted in a silent environment, 
avoiding noise or disturbances that could interrupt the participant.  
The approach for the interview was based on the PEACE model (Clarke & Milne, 2001). The 
participants were informed about the purpose of the study and how the data would be used. 
All participants were assured confidentiality and the right to withdraw from the study at any 
time. All participants signed a written consent and agreed upon being tape-recorded.  
Lengths of the interviews: The lengths of the interviews varied between 30 and 70 minutes 
and had in average a duration of 45 minutes (SD=17,23).   
 
Processing The Interviews and Analysis 
Transcribing: The interviews were recorded on a digital recording device and later 
copied to a computer. The interviews were then transcribed verbatim. Words that had no 
semantic significance, such as repetitions and hesitation, were excluded. The author 
transcribed five of the interviews. The remaining five was shared between two fellow 
students. Four of the interviews were crosschecked by listening trough the taped interview 
and note significant discrepancies between the tape and the transcript The proofreading 
showed an all over good quality of the transcribed interviews. 
Unitizing: In order to code and analyze a recorded stream of verbalization, in this case 
the interviews, it is necessary to segment the text into smaller units. Unitizing means 
identifying units of coding within a text (Krippendorff, 2004). The goal of unitizing is to 
select the empirically most meaningful and informative units that are both reliably identifiable 
and relevant for the following analysis. To achieve these often conflicting objectives, one has 
to make compromises (Krippendorff, 2004). 
One of the purposes of identifying statements was to make it possible to see which statements 
that could later on be categorized onto existing theories or models. This is called a model-
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driven SWOT approach, or M-SWOT (Hoff, 2009). M-SWOT analysis have earlier 
successfully applied principles from content analysis and have defined a statement as “the 
smallest meaningful unit that reflects the informant’s experience and understanding of the 
topic of interest” (Hoff, Flakke, et al., 2009, p. 7). Such statement can involve a part of a 
sentence, a whole sentence or several sentences, according to this definition.  
What defines meaningful will ultimately rely on the researcher’s judgment. M-SWOT 
analysis usually guides identification of statements from the categories given in the analysis 
(SWOT/ theoretical model). As the present study is foremost an explorative study it was a 
primary concern not to disregard statements that did not account for any pre-known categories 
or theories. Hence, in addition to the definition mentioned above (Hoff, Flakke, et al., 2009), a 
user-defined, declarative unitizing instruction was applied.  
 The important thing was that a statement is understood as the participant’s reflection to 
the interviewers question and topic of interest (demanding maritime operations, and the way 
they worked), independent of any models and theories about the topic. A statement should be, 
to the extent possible, comprehensible by itself and contain only one piece of information, 
idea, evaluation or point of view. It is considered a new statement if the participant expresses 
a new piece of information, semantically different from the previous. The complementary 
unitizing instruction can be found in Appendix C. 
Coding: Statements from the transcribed interviews were then transferred into PASW 
statistics for coding. By following the principles from M-SWOT analysis, each statement was 
tested to see if they could fit into existing categories of the chosen models. Each statement 
were coded in three models; SWOT, the model of psychological characteristics of experts 
(PCE), developed by Shanteau (1992), and SCM, adapted from Flin et al. (2000). Statements 
were first of all coded in the SWOT model that included four categories, inspired from 
Chermack and Kasshanna (2007): 
 
Strengths: Positive aspects of the way they work and handle demanding maritime 
operations or daily work today. Can be competencies, capabilities or strengths with a 
certain practice. Dimension: Here and now. 
Weaknesses: Negative aspects of the way they work today and handle demanding 
maritime operations or daily work. Can be lack of competencies, skills, capabilities or 
weaknesses with a certain practice. Dimension: Here and now. 
Opportunities: Positive aspects of how things could be done better in the future for 
how they work. How they could improve, or handle demanding operations better in 
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some way. Something they don’t have today. Dimension: Future. 
Threats:  How the way they work today could evolve in a negative way. Negative 
circumstances which could make things even worse, or set safety and efficiency at 
stake. How could things get even worse than it is today? Dimension: Future.  
SWOT residual: Statements that do not fit into any of the above SWOT category. E.g. 
normative utterances such as “there is much work to do these days”.  
 
Shanteau’s (1992) model of psychological characteristics of experts (PCE) explain 
general characteristics that experts tend to show. To see if these characteristics fit any of the 
statements reflected by the participants the principles of M-SWOT analysis were applied 
(Hoff, Flakke, et al., 2009). 
Although the title of each category in Shanteau’s theory is comprehensible, the given 
description of each category is normative and relatively short; hence in order to achieve 
sufficient reliability in the coding process, a small elaboration of each category was needed. 
Each category was considered value-free in the coding process. The characteristic 9) “adapt 
decision strategies to changing task conditions”, and strategies, 5) “operate as though coming 
close enough”, 6) “follow some sort of divide and conquer strategy”, and 7) “break problems 
down” where excluded from the analysis due to a great deal of overlapping with other 
categories. This will be further discussed in the limitation part. As a result, five of the 
categories were excluded. The categories were defined as follow: 
 
1. Content knowledge: deals with knowledge and experience expressed to be 
important, e.g. details about what you get from experience and knowledge needed 
in order to work safe and efficient. 
2. Perceptual/attention abilities: deals with the characteristic of having the 
“correct” attention and concentrate on important things.  
3. Sense of what is relevant when making decisions: deals with distinguishing 
relevant from irrelevant materials when working, e.g. don’t waste time on 
insignificant things. 
4. Simplify complex problems / break problems into simpler parts: deals with 
making sense out of chaos or to adapt decision strategies to changing task 
conditions, e.g. break problems into parts and handle it from there. 
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5. Communication: deals with communication and the importance of this aspect of 
their work, e.g. the importance for them to communicate a collective 
understanding of the task. 
6. Handle adversity: deals with the ability to work under stressful conditions and to 
keep calm and steady. 
7. Identifying and adapting to exceptions / make continuous adjustment: deals 
with adapting to special situations and to work outside the box. Novices, for 
instance, persist on following well-established rules.  
8. Self-confidence in decision-making: Covers statements that express something 
about self-confidence and faith in ones abilities. Experts tend to believe in 
themselves and their capacity to make good decisions.  
9. Strong sense of responsibility: Covers statements that express something about 
responsibilities and how responsibility affect their work-practice. 
10. Get help from others to make better decisions: deals with their work practice 
involving seeking feedback from others, and consolidation with colleagues and 
subordinates to gain insight. Also covers group interaction. 
11. Make use of formal or informal decision aids: deals with the usage of aids that 
are needed to assist their work in decision-making. For instance, written records of 
prior decisions or standard rules or procedures that help them doing their work. 
12. Try to avoid making large mistakes: deals with statements that express their 
priority to avoid making large mistakes that could include that coming close is 
good enough.  
13. Residual: statements that do not fit to any of the above categories.  
 
The safety climate model (SCM) is based on a review article by Flin et al. (2000) 
where they identified a set of common dimensions of safety climate based on 18 published 
reports of safety climate surveys. The definition of the dimensions is based on Flin et al. 
(2000), and Imseth (2008).  
 
1. Management: Perceptions of management’s commitment, attitudes or behavior in 
relation to safety, production or other issues (selection, planning, satisfaction with 
supervisor etc.)  
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2. Safety system: perceptions of the organization’s safety management system such as 
state of performance of safety officials and committees, safety policies, safety 
equipment, etc. 
3. Risk perception: Self reported risk taking, perceptions of risks, hazards, or attitudes 
towards risk and safety. 
4. Work pressure: Challenges regarding pressure for production and safety 
5. Competence: Qualifications, skills and knowledge. Level of qualifications. Selection, 
training, standards.  
6. Procedures/rules: Perceptions of safety rules, attitudes to rules and compliance or 
violations of procedures. 
7. Blame: Perceptions of how blame is distributed in the wake of accidents or incidents 
8. Organizational learning. How the organization learns from experience.  
 
Inter-rater Reliability in Coding Statements 
Since familiarity with the text and its theme is a prerequisite for reliable coding, the 
coding was done after transcriptions and unitizing (Krippendorff, 2004). Furthermore, to 
ensure consistency in the coding process, a randomly selected interview was early in the 
coding process tested for inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s Kappa. Cohen’s Kappa was 
considered the best measure for inter-rater reliability since this measure account for the 
probability of agreement by chance. Both the author and a fellow student coded a part of a 
randomly selected interview by following the coding instructions. The results showed a 
Chohen’s Kappa (κ) of .671 on the SWOT categories, .503 on SCM, and .432 on PCE. 
According the benchmark standards for interpreting Kappa by Landis and Koch (1977), the 
level of agreement is considered substantial on the SWOT categories, and a moderate on 
SCM and PCE.  
 
Content Analysis 
Statements not accounted for by either of the models were qualitatively analyzed. Two 
approaches for this process were considered; thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), and 
content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004). The two techniques share many similarities, but 
content analysis pays greater attention to the quantitative aspects of the analyzed material. 
Since the identified themes and patterns in the text will be counted and represented in a 
hierarchal order, content analysis was considered most appropriate tool.  
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Statistical Analysis  
After coding statements in PASW statistics, it was possible to run statistic analysis to 
test whether there were systematic differences in the dataset. Paired t-test was conducted in 
able to test the stated hypothesis.  
 
Ethical Considerations 
Voluntary participation. All participations were voluntary, and each participant was 
well informed about the project trough briefing from the interviewer and the information 
letter given on beforehand. Each participant signed an informed consent were they were 
informed about their possibility to withdraw from the study at any time.  
Some of the participants were recruited trough their supervisor, and could possibly feel some 
obligation to participate although participation was completely voluntary.  
Confidentiality. The participants were assured confidentiality of any information 
gathered from them. Both personal names and the name of the respective shipping company 
each participant belonged to will not be cited.  
Tape recorder. Each participant verbally agreed upon being tape-recorded. The use of 
a tape recorder was also stated in the informed consent. The participants were informed about 
how the tape-recorded interview would be transcribed, but ensured that no information could 
be traced back to them. The use of tape recorders can be inconvenient for the participant since 
this can make the situation more formal and serious. This was rendered harmless trough 
briefing of the purpose of using this equipment.  
Treatment of data. The tape-recorded interviews were transcribed and then later 
deleted. The transcribed interviews will remain in the department, but will not be used outside 
the terms cited in the written consent (Appendix B) 
Health consequences. The interview was not regarded to have any negative impact on 
health, and the participants were treated in accordance to principles in PEACE (Clarke & 
Milne, 2001) and the Norwegian Work Environment Act , emphasizing integrity and respect.  
	   	   	  22	  
Results 
Descriptive Results 
It was identified a total of 1947 statements (M = 194.70, SD = 93.17) regarding 
demanding maritime operations, and the way working in demanding maritime operations 
from the ten interviews. All statements were first coded in SWOT, and then coded on the 
model of psychological characteristics of experts (PCM) and Safety Climate Model (SCM).  
SWOT: In sum, 1053 (54,1 %) of the total number of statements could be accounted for in 
SWOT. The distribution of statements on the SWOT categories is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of statements in SWOT (N=10) 
 Frequency Percent Mean Std 
Strengths 617 31.7 % 61.7 28.69 
Weaknesses 179 9.2 % 17.9 20.78 
Opportunities 71 3.6 % 7.1 8.3 
Threats  186 9.6 % 18.6 14.42 
Sum SWOT 1053 54.1 % 105.3 53.41 
Residual 894 45.6 % 89.4 49.28 
TOTAL 1947 100 % 194.7 93.17 
 
As shown in Table 1, the distribution of statements in the SWOT-categories is not 
evenly distributed. The majority of the statements were accounted as strengths, with 617 (31.7 
%) statements. Next, threats with 186 (9.6  %), then weaknesses with 179 (9.2 %) statements, 
and finally opportunities with a total of 71 (3.6 %) statements. The remaining 894 (45,6 %) of 
the total 1942 statements could not be counted for as SWOT statements. Statements not 
accounted for by SWOT were value-free statements that were considered relevant for the 
research question and were not excluded from the following analysis (e.g. “there are always 
clients onboard when we carry out a job”, “there are never two similar days”, “it is much 
about experience and what you have practiced earlier”).  
Psychological characteristics of experts (PCE): In sum, 771 (M = 77.1, SD= 34,03) of 
the total 1947 identified statements could be accounted for in the model of psychological 
characteristics of expertise. Content knowledge had the highest number of statements with 
236 (12.1 %) statements. The second highest number of statements was identified in the 
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category “Make use of formal or informal decision aids” with a total of 111 (5.7 %) 
statements. The distribution of statements in PCE is presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of statements in psychological characteristics of expertise (N=10) 
Psychological Characteristics of expert Sum %  Mean SD 
1. Content knowledge 236 12.1 % 23,6 18.63 
2. Perceptional and attention abilities 38 2.0 % 3.6 2.85 
3. Sense of what is relevant when making decisions 31 1.6 % 3.1 2.92 
4. Simplify complex problems 11 0.6 % 1.1 1.37 
5. Communication 79 4.1 % 7.9 9.36 
6. Handle adversity 53 2.7 % 5.3 3.94 
7. Self confidence in decision making 59 3.0 % 5.9 6.72 
8. Adapt decision strategies to changing task conditions 44 2.3 % 4.4 2.79 
9. Strong sense of responsibility 25 1.3 % 2.5 2.41 
10. Get help from other to make better decisions 77 4.0 % 7.7 3.40 
11. Make use of formal or informal decision aids 111 5.7 % 11.1 8.30 
12. Avoid making large mistakes 7 0.4 % 0.7 1.56 
SUM PCE 771 39.6 % 77.1 34.03 
13. Residual 1176 60.4 % 117.6 66.44 
TOTAL 1947 100 % 194.7 93.17 
 
As shown in Table 3, the standard deviation on the category content knowledge is 
relatively high, indicating that some participants contributed with more statements than 
others.  
SCM: Safety climate model accounted for 890 (M=89, SD=45.68) statements of the 
total 1947 identified statements from the interviews. The distribution is presented in Table 4. 
The highest number of statements were identified in the category “competence, training” 
with a total of 340 (17.5 %) statements. Next, the categories work pressure and 
procedures/rules both got 145 (4.5 %) statements each. The category blame was identified 
two times (0.1 %), and had the lowest number of statements in SCM.  	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Table 4: Distribution of statements over SCM (N=10) 
SCM Sum % Mean SD 
1. Management 37 1.9 % 3.7 4.92 
2. Safety systems 78 4.0 % 7.8 6.05 
3. Risk perception 110 5.6 % 11 10.64 
4. Work pressure 145 7.4 % 14.5 13.50 
5. Competence, training 340 17.5 % 34 23.65 
6. Procedures / rules 145 7.4 % 14.5 12.67 
7. Blame 2 0.1 % .2 0.63 
8. Organizational learning 33 1.7 % 3.3 2.79 
SUM SCM 890 45.7 %  89 45.68 
9. Residual 1057 54.3 % 105.7 52.99 
TOTAL 1947 100 %  194.7 93.17 	  
Figure 1 & 2: Graphical representation of percentage distribution of statements on PCE and SCM. 
PCE is presented on the left, and SCM on the right.  
	  
As shown in Figure 1 and 2, all categories were activated from the interviews, but display 
uneven distribution.  
 
PCE and SCM together. Figure 3 illustrates the relative coverage of statements 
between PCE and SCM. In sum, 1206 statements could be accounted for in SCM and PCE. 
This constitutes 61.9 % of the total 1947 statements. In sum 455 (23.4 %) of the statements 
could be coded in both PCE and SCM. The unique coverage of PCE and SCM then becomes 
316 and 435 respectively.  
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Note: PCE= Psychological characteristics of experts, SCM= Safety Climate Model, 
R=residual statement 
A closer examination of the overlapping statements shows that the majority of these 
includes statements that is identified as 5) competence / training in SCM, which is distributed 
amongst several characteristics on PCE. Table 5 displays crosstab of statements between PCE 
and SCM that shows which categories that covers the same statements. Also worth noticing 
from Table 5 is that be the category 11) make use of decision aids in PCE have some 

















R:	  741	   1206	  
435	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Table 5: Crosstab safety climate model (SCM), and psychological characteristics of experts (PCE) 
 SCM 
PCE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (R) SUM 
1 4 3 10 8 106 14 0 4 87 236 
2 0 0 4 0 18 0 0 0 16 38 
3 0 0 4 0 17 0 0 0 10 31 
4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 7 11 
5 0 0 0 3 34 5 0 0 37 79 
6 1 0 3 3 18 0 0 2 26 53 
7 0 3 6 3 10 6 0 0 31 59 
8 0 0 6 6 8 0 0 0 24 44 
9 0 1 7 1 2 0 0 0 12 25 
10 2 3 1 0 5 15 1 11 40 77 
11 3 35 5 1 5 39 0 4 19 111 
12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 
13 (R) 27 33 63 120 113 66 0 12 741 1176 
SUM 37 78 110 145 340 145 1 33 1057 1947 
Note: SCM: 1= Management, 2=Safety system, 3=risk perception, 4=Work pressure, 5= Competence, 
6=procedures, 7=Blame, 8= Organizational learning, 9=residual 
PCE: 1= Content knowledge, 2=perception, 3=sense of what is relevant when making decisions, 4= 
Simplify complex problems, 5= competence, 6= Handle adversity, 7= adapting to exceptions, 8=Self 
confidence, 9= strong sense of responsibility, 10=get help from others to make better decisions, 
11=make use of decision aids, 12=try to avoid making large mistakes, 13=residual. 
 
Test of Hypothesis 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that there would be no significant differences between number of 
identified statements in total and the number of statements accounted for in the model of 
expert characteristics by Shanteau. In order to test this hypothesis, a paired t-test was carried 
out to compare the total amount of identified statements (M = 194.70, SD = 93.17), and 
statements accounted for in PCE (M = 77.1, SD = 34,03). The results revealed a significant 
difference between the two groups, t(9) = 5.597, p <.000. 
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Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be no significant differences between the 
number of statements accounted for in total and the number of statements accounted for by 
SCM. A paired t-test was carried out to compare the total amount of identified statements (M 
= 194.70, SD = 93.17), and statements accounted for in SCM (M = 89, SD = 45.68). The 
results revealed a significant difference between the two groups t(9) = 6.308, p <.001.  
Hypothesis 3 expected that there would be no significant differences between number 
of identified statements in total and the number of statements accounted for by both model of 
expert characteristics and safety climate model combined. To test this hypothesis, a paired t-
test examined the difference between the total amount of statements (M =194.70, SD = 93.17) 
against the combined number of hits on PCE and SCM (M = 120.6, SD = 56.6). The results 
revealed that there was a significant difference between the two groups t(9)= 5.686, p<.001. 
Hypothesis 4 expected that statements not accounted for after coding in both PCE and 
SCM would be redundant information and have no relevance to how work is carried out in 
demanding maritime operations. To closer examine this assumption, the residual statements 
were analyzed by conducting a content analysis with the aim at identifying themes and 
patterns in the text. The analysis resulted in 24 identified themes, which were then placed into 
one of three categories; individual, group, and work domain, for a pragmatic differentiation of 
the themes. A summary of the analysis is presented in Table 7. 
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Table	  6:	  Content	  analysis	  of	  the	  residual	  statements. 
Context Theme Number of statements 
Individual Planning and project management 45 
 Trial and error, errors caused by habits etc. 31 
 Tough work 23 
 Boat handling / ship sense 25 
 Multitasking 21 
 Lack of rest 13 
 Interest and engagement in work 12 
 Stress / illness 10 
 Administrative work / paperwork 9 
 Creativity 8 
Group Teamwork 71 
 Teach/training of new staff 25 
 Cultural differences in workforce 22 
 Ageing workforce 9 
Work domain Technical and mechanical equipment 51 
 Advanced technology and better vessels 37 
 Weather conditions/ environmental constraints 35 
 Hands on experience from working on deck 32 
 Clients  30 
 Differences between vessels 28 
 Economy and organizational development 28 
 Suppliers of equipment 17 
 Differences in each operation 13 
 International workforce 9 
 Not relevant 137 
Sum  741 
 
As presented in Table 6, themes placed at the individual level deals with matters that 
are relevant from a personal point of view. Planning and project management, for instance, 
were mentioned quite often, referring to the importance of having a clear plan of how the 
operation should be carried out. Lack of planning could be a possible threat to safety. Trial 
and error were also mentioned relatively often, referring to the fact that failures, both human 
and technically, is a normal thing. Also a part of daily work is the fact that tasks are 
sometimes physically hard, and that certain guts are required to handle daily challenges. 
Many participants also mention the importance of manual boat handling, and that freshmen 
often lack this skill. Stress and lack of rest can in turn have a negative effect on safety and 
efficiency. Stress and lack of rest were sometimes related to a few statements that focused on 
the negative impact of constantly more paperwork when performing their duties. Finally, 
creativity was also highlighted as an important characteristic with how to deal with 
unanticipated working conditions.  
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On group level, there were mainly four important aspect not accounted for in the 
models used in this study. Teamwork accounted for a majority of these statements, including 
both positive and negative aspects of teamwork in their daily work. Several participants also 
mentioned the importance of paying attention to training of new staff and that experienced 
officers should be more willingly to spend more time on training inexperienced workers. 
Next, cultural differences between the crew were mentioned as an important aspect related to 
communication and collective understanding of a critical operation. Finally, some participants 
mentioned an ageing workforce as a general concern in the future. 
Themes placed in work-domain level deals with statements reflecting constraints in 
the work-environment relevant for how they perform their work. Technical and mechanical 
equipment, for instance, are mentioned quite often. This theme emphasizes the importance of 
having a conscious awareness of the equipment they use. Another aspect of their work was 
related to the continuous and rapid technological development in for instance the instruments 
they use. The increasing detail-level at the surveillance monitors was for instance a rather 
negative feature that could increase complexity of their work. Another constraint frequently 
mentioned was the weather conditions and the need to assess this aspect of the operation 
constantly. Understanding wind and underwater current that affect boat performance are 
critical for safe performance. 
Statements regarding clients onboard were also mentioned several times. Sometimes 
this aspect was positive, having someone to discuss safety-issues with. In other 
circumstances, having clients onboard was perceived as an additional stress-element when 
performing complex tasks. Another theme dealing with work-domain issues were about lack 
of involvement from equipment-suppliers. Some participants mentioned the importance of 
customizing equipment design in accordance with the requirements from the users. Lastly, 
some participants mentioned that all work involves a great deal of situation-depended 
situations, and that each operation has its unique features, making it difficult to relate their 
work to a specific situation.  
Summing up, a clear majority of the residual statements involve information that is 
relevant for how they work in demanding maritime operations. The 137 statements marked as 
not relevant did not contain any semantically meaningful information related to how they 
work. A great deal of these statements included small talk, and citations expressing lack of 
reflection of the issues that were discussed; “I haven’t thought about these matters so much”.  
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Discussion 
Summary of Results 
The purpose of this study was to empirically test two different models/framework that 
account for human factors and test their ability to account for reflections of work practice in 
demanding maritime operations, gathered from semi-structured interviews. Analysis shows 
that the semi-structured interviews generated a lot of information regarding AHTS- and PSV 
officer’s way of work. A total of 1947 statements were identified and coded in PCE and SCM.  
The descriptive results show that, individually, PCE accounted for 39.6 %, while SCM 
accounted for 45.7 % of the 1947 statements. When these models are applied to the same 
dataset simultaneously, they could account for 61.9 %, or 1206 statements. In other words, the 
combined models could account for a larger part of the statements than they could 
individually. However, as illustrated in Figure 3, a majority (455) of these statements could be 
coded in both PCE and SCM. This implies that they are to some degree accounts for the same 
aspects that were brought up in the interviews.   
Hypothesis 1 was applied to test whether a model of expertise, based on Shanteau 
(1992) was able to account for the same topics that marine officers brought up when asked 
about their work practices in demanding maritime operations. Despite that the model was 
considered an extensive framework, the analysis show that only 771 of the 1947 statements 
from the interviews could be accounted for by PCE. The distribution of statements as 
presented in Table 3 shows that all categories were activated, and the category content 
knowledge was identified in over 12 % of the cases. The t-test test shows that there were 
statisticaly significant differences between the group of identified statemements in PCE and in 
total. This implies that the number of matching statements was too small to say that the model 
can account for the majority of data that was gathered in this study. For this reason, 
hypothesis 1 could not be supported 
Hypothesis 2 was applied in order to test whether a safety climate model, based on a 
generic framework presented by Flin et al. (2000) could account for the same topics that 
marine officers brought up when asked about their work practice in demanding maritime 
operations. The analysis show that in sum 890 of the 1947 identified statements could be 
coded into the dimensions given by SCM. SCM was in other words able to account for more 
statements than the used model of expertise. As can be seen in the descriptive results, all 
categories in this model where also activated. The category “competence/ training” scored 
substantial more than the other categories with 17.5 % of the total amount of identified 
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statements. Despite a higher number of identified statements than PCE, the result from the 
statistical analysis imply that there were substantial differences between the number of 
statements identified in SCM, and the number of statements identified in total. For this 
reason, hypothesis 2 could not be supported.  
Hypothesis 3. As discussed in the introduction, studying work in complex 
sociotechnical system is a matter of cross-scale interactions. Woods and Hollnagel (2006), 
and Rasmussen (1997) argued that the large problem space and dynamic complexity of a 
sociotechnical system require a wide approach. The study of Gould et al. (2006) and 
Hetherington et al. (2006) showed that marine accidents always were a matter of multiple 
factors. Hypothesis 3 was therefore applied to test whether a combined model of PCE and 
SCM could together account for all statements generated from the interviews. The results 
showed that the combined models accounted for 1206, or 61.9 % of the total number of 
statements. This implies that they could to some degree account for a larger part of the 
statements than the models were able to individually. However, as shown in Table 5, a 
substantial part of these statements were identified in both models. Thus, the statistic analysis 
shows that despite its relative bigger coverage, the number of identified statements in both 
models was found to be significant smaller than the number of identified statements in total. 
Hypothesis 3 could therefore not be supported.  
Hypothesis 4. Following the rationale behind hypothesis 1, 2, and 3, hypothesis 4 
expected that statements not accounted for by either PCE or SCM would not be relevant for 
how work is carried out in demanding maritime operations. A content analysis with a 
following thematic categorization was conducted to test this notion. The analysis resulted in 
24 main themes, as presented in Table 5, which were all considered relevant aspects towards 
the way they work in demanding operations. A pragmatic differentiation between themes at 
the level of individual, group and work domain illustrates the diversity of the themes. Beside 
teamwork, as the theme brought up most frequently, aspects around technical equipment and 
advanced technology were something that was given much attention. The importance of 
planning and project management was also something they often brought up as significant in 
relation to how they worked. The 137 identified as not relevant were mostly small talk and 
was short-numbered. In summary, the result from this analysis could not support hypothesis 4.  
 
General Discussion  
The maritime industry faces several challenges related to increased complexity in 
offshore oil- and gas production. The Bourbon Dolphin accident is an apparent example of the 
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imminent danger demanding maritime operations involves. Rapid technological development 
of onboard equipment as well as changes in the organizational structure furthermore 
represents a shift in the way mariners cope with the demands that is presented to them. The 
more we understand this complexity and how the crew manage and interacts with the factors 
that shape behavior, the more we will be able to make the right interventions to ensure safe 
and reliable operations in the future. For this reason it is critical to reflect on the basic 
assumptions on what factors that shape human performance in complex systems. 
This study shows that by using a method that avoids leading the participant in any 
specific direction, officers reflect about theoretically different relevant themes. The aim of 
using a model of expertise and a model of safety climate was not an attempt to measure the 
level of expertise or an attempt to measure safety climate. Instead, the models were used as 
frameworks to test if the topics covered in the interviews were the same aspects as those 
covered in the respective models. Although the results from the analysis show that the models 
could not account for the majority of the statements in this study, this is not the same as to say 
they are not relevant at all. The fact that the models combined were able to account for 61.9 % 
of the statements does indicate that they are to some extent relevant for assessing work in the 
maritime domain.  
The results bring us back to the discussion about what to look for when assessing 
safety and performance in complex sociotechnical systems. Rasmussen (1997) argues that the 
cross-scale interactions between different elements in a complex sociotechnical system are 
fundamental aspects of how these systems work. Consequently, the aspects that shape 
behavior are numerous and practitioners are left with the challenge of using a relevant unit of 
analysis. The studies from Gould et al. (2006) and Hetherington et al. (2006) illustrate that the 
units of analysis can be various in a maritime context, and furthermore that organizational, 
personnel, and design issues makes some assumptions about where we could start looking.  
The results from this study indicate that the factors the crew find significant in relation 
to how they perform their work are related to issues at the technical, personnel and 
organizational levels. In other words, it is not sufficient to look at only one of these 
approaches to gain a substantial picture of the factors that affect safety and performance. A 
model of expertise, or any other individual-centered approach for that matter, will be able to 
account for only some aspect that is important when performing work. Similarly, a safety 
climate model will account for some other relevant features, but will miss several others. 
Combining them is an alternative, but yet there are some aspects left out. This problem 
touches upon a fundamental question in how we understand and study work in complex 
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system. Treating organizational and personnel issues as separate units of analysis will 
eventually leave us with some black spots that will not be accounted for.  
So, where does this leave us with regard to the models used in this study? Shanteau 
(1992) claimed to have successfully identified a set of characteristics and strategies that is 
common for expert performance across different domains. The fact that statements from 
operating officers could be placed on all of the 12 categories used in this study show that his 
framework could be a useful instrument when accounting for work in demanding maritime 
operations. On the other hand, it is interesting to ask why over 60 % of the statements fell 
outside the dimensions in PCE. This might have several explanations. One might be that the 
model as a theoretical framework works perfectly fine, but that the participants in this study 
were not experts. Conversely it can be argued that the participants can be considered experts 
in what they do, but that the model is not capable to sufficiently account for all the 
dimensions that that is important for expert performance in demanding maritime operations. 
Based on the last argument, it is timely to ask whether the model would benefit from an 
update if used in a maritime context. 
The answer behind the missing 60 % can perhaps best be understood in light of the 
results after coding statements in SCM. The descriptive results in table 3 and 4 show that the 
categories which received most statements in both models were about knowledge and 
competence / training. Håvold (2010) and Morel, Amalberti and Chauvin (2008) do also 
highlight that knowledge and general know-how are critical components for handling marine 
vessels. Furthermore, the categories work pressure, procedure / rules, risk perception, and 
safety systems in SCM also received a substantial amount of statements. Although this study 
cannot give an account for the degree of importance of these dimensions, it is reasonable to 
ask whether these dimensions also could be relevant when examining characteristics of expert 
performance in demanding operations.  
Perrow (1999) argues that the structure of the maritime industry, with its social 
organization onboard, economic pressure, and challenges related to international regulations 
makes it difficult to control errors. Expert performance in a maritime context must 
consequently be seen in light of the various aspects that affect the overall performance of the 
vessel. From this perspective it might beneficial to include some of the dimensions from 
safety climate into the framework of expertise in a maritime context. On the other side it 
might be just as relevant to ask whether it is helpful to include aspects of expert performance 
when accounting for safety climate. The potential consequences of using a “wrong” model, 
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either looking to study safety climate or expertise, would be that they will fail to account for 
critical aspects that might influence safety and efficiency in future operations.  
 
Implications 
First, the most apparent implication of this study constitute as a contribution to the 
research area that aims at studying the human element in complex sociotechnical systems, or 
more precisely towards work in the maritime domain. The results of this study show that the 
crew, as an integrated as a part of a dynamic environment, reflects about several constraints in 
their work environment, being about both individual oriented perspectives, organizational 
oriented and also technical oriented. The frameworks used in this study consequently failed to 
account for this complexity. Rasmussen (1997), Vicente (1999), and Woods and Hollnagel 
(2006) argue that the cross scale interactions between different parts of a sociotechnical 
system are a crucial aspect of how these systems works. This does also call for a cross-
disciplinary research community that focuses on performance on a system level.  
Secondly, a more practical implication of this study can be seen in light of the results 
of the content analysis of the residual statements. A clear tendency of these themes, as listed 
in Table 5, is that most of them are non-technical issues. Barnett et al. (NOU, 2008: 8) 
pointed out that although non-technical skills are acknowledged as core concepts for 
managing crisis at vessels, it is also recognized that these skills are context specific. This can 
be seen in light of the Bourbon Dolphin accident report (McGeorge, Hands, & Rugg, 1994), 
which argued that there was a lack of tailored guidelines for anchor-handling operations. The 
report furthermore stated that the expertise that is required for operating demanding maritime 
operations reaches far beyond the standard minimum requirements. The result from the 
analysis in this study show that, besides teamwork, many statements deal with the aspect of 
planning and managing projects, handling onboard clients and economical interest. These 
findings may be of interest for those designing simulation training and putting together CRM / 
BRM training for operating crew. 
Third, future complex maritime operations require that mariners continually train to 
upgrade their knowledge and skills. It is thus critical that we reflect on the assumptions that 
underlie performance. The success of training programs always depends on the identification 
of appropriate interventions and requires systematically collecting, reviewing, and analyzing 
performance related data (Kvale, 1996). Today, human factors researchers can turn to a 
sizable stock of concepts that are used to express insight about human performance. Mental 
states such as stress, workload or situational awareness, as mentioned by Hetherington et al. 
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(2006) have however received criticism for being what Dekker and Hollnagel (2004) term 
“folk models”. Folk models, they claim, focus on the state of a cognitive process more than 
the actual performance; hence a measurement of stress will in other words provide 
insignificant insight of how crew can get better at what they do. This study can however 
provide several insights into characteristics that are found to be relevant for how experienced 
crew reflect upon their way of work, which include characteristics of the crew, the 
organization and the equipment. Although the used models in this study could not achieve a 
complete match, this is not to say that they are not relevant. There is great potential to further 
examine, validate and test these models more throughout.  
Fourth, existing safety measures will eventually outdate in term with how the industry 
evolves. The strength of a theoretical framework that aims to assess issues related to safety 
depends upon its ability to account for the “right stuff”. This study demonstrated that there are 
several aspects that neither of the models used in this study was capable to account for. This 




This study used semi structured interviews and quantified qualitative data to run 
statistical tests. This will imply some limitations that can have an impact on how the results 
are interpreted.  
Sample: Despite the fact that the interviews were able to gather a substantial amount of 
statements, this study had only ten participants in total and it is always relevant to ask whether 
this number is sufficient. The number of participants in qualitative studies always depends on 
the objective of the study, and most qualitative studies tend to have around 10 ± 15 
participants (Robson, 2002). This study was an explorative study, and seeing the number of 
participants in light of the difficulties of gathering participants in addition to the time and 
resources available, 10 participants is not a huge setback. However, since the analysis 
involved quantification of statements to conduct statistical analysis, the small number of 
participants may have biased the results. High standard deviations on some categories, as 
shown in the descriptive results, indicate that some participants were more talkative than 
others. This may have a link to the range of experience between the participants. Some 
participants had only had 8 years of experience while others had over 45 years shipping 
experience. A more uniform group, and more participants could have given other results. 
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Nevertheless, the pattern in the dataset is considered applicable for this study, and it is an 
empirical question whether other or more participants would have given other results.  
Interviews: Interviews is a flexible and adaptable method. However, the quality of the 
results heavily depends upon the quality of the interviews and it is important to be aware of 
the fact that the researcher is the primary research tool (Kvale, 1996). Interviews can be 
biased by the interviewers behavior and his or her ability to obtain a common understanding 
of what the purpose and objects of the interview is (2004). Although the interviewer in this 
study had adequate training and relevant experience for the chosen method, general 
inconsistency of each interview based on location and available time may have an impact on 
how the results turned out. One interviews was conducted in English, and language 
difficulties may also have affected the results.  
The interview questions was designed with the purpose of letting the participants 
freely reflect what they found significant related to the way they worked. Some participants 
expressed difficulties of knowing what to answer. It might be that the interview questions 
were too general. This can also be seen in light of the relative high number of statements not 
accounted for as a strength, weakness, opportunity, or threat, as shown in Table 2. Much of 
these statements involved remarks about what demanding maritime operations was all about. 
This was also the nature of the first interview question, and was regarded a crucial part of 
getting an understanding of the topic in the interviews. On the other side, the high number of 
statements not accounted for in SWOT might reflect the general finding of this paper, that the 
participants find it difficult to relate themselves towards their way of work without including 
a lot of contextual information.  
Unitizing: The unit of analysis in this study is based upon quantified statements. 
Splitting up a stream of verbalization into units or statements involves subjective judgment 
from the researcher. Krippendorff (Hoff, Straumsheim, Bjørkli, & Bjørklund, 2009) state that 
it is often hard to accomplish both reliable and semantic meaningful units at once. The 
findings in this study are therefore to a great extent depended upon the operatialization of a 
statement. There is always a possibility that other researchers would have judged a statement 
differently and furthermore that the frequency of statements could have been a different value. 
A superficial reliability check of the unitizing procedure was conducted early in the unitizing 
process with a few differences observed. However, a more comprehensive inter judgment 
reliability analysis could have examined the process of unitizing more throughout and come 
up with different results. Future studies that plan to use the same methodological approach 
should examine the unitizing reliability more throughout. Using a syntactic definition of a 
	   	   	  37	  
statement, like a paragraph or a sentence, could on the one side increase reliability. However, 
this could have interrupted with the semantic meaning in the text and could have affected 
validity of the findings. The semantic meaning of a statement is regarded more important in 
an explorative study.  
Coding: The operationalization of a statement will furthermore also affect how the 
statements are coded into categories. The definition of the each category is to the extent 
possible based on the original definition from the paper it is gathered from. The model of 
expertise, based on Shanteau (1992) provides however only a small elaboration of each 
dimension. Hence, to increase reliability of the coding process, each category was considered 
value free and was tailored for this specific study. This means that a statement that contained 
the theme communication was coded in the category communication in PCE regardless if it 
was a positive or a negative feature. In addition, four of the dimensions where excluded from 
the analysis due to high degree of overlapping with other categories, and it was difficult to 
discriminate between each dimension. For instance, characteristic 7) identify and adapt to 
exceptions and 9) adopt decision strategies to changing task conditions are semantically quite 
similar and was found difficult to separate. Furthermore, characteristic 4) simplify complex 
problems and the strategy 15) break problems into simpler parts, is also semantically similar, 
and was combined. These interventions will necessarily influence with the validity of testing 
this Shanteau’s (1992) framework.  
The inter rater reliability, measured with Cohen’s Kappa, was found to be acceptable 
in terms of the guidelines provided by Landis and Koch (1977). However, earlier studies 
based on the same methodological basis have reached higher inter-rater reliability, and shows 
that it is possible to obtain a reasonable inter-rater agreement in this kind of research. Low 
inter rater can imply that is can be difficult to replicate this study and come up with the same 
results.  
Content analysis: The results from this study are based on both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. There is always a possibility that the meanings and content of a statement 
might have been misinterpreted. Furthermore, counting the number of statements within the 
same general theme does not necessarily entail the significance of this theme. The absence of 
a certain theme is not the same as it is not relevant. However, the quantitative results must be 
seen in light of the qualitative results. The fact that the models was not able to account for all 
statements can be seen in light of the qualitative results that reveal a lot of domain-specific 
details. A full thematic or content analysis of the complete interviews could possibly give 
some valuable insights into the dataset.  
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Suggestion for Further Research 
There exist little research that empirically tests the applicability of different theoretical 
frameworks that account for human behavior in complex systems. More research is therefore 
needed on the models we use to understand and assess the contribution of the human element 
in the maritime domain. This study forms a foundation for a number of directions for future 
research.  
One direction that can be informative for this understanding is the relative importance 
of each category in the used models, as this gives an indication of which factors that is 
relevant for the studied domain. As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 the distribution of statements 
across categories was uneven for both models. Since the method used in this study does not 
allow for a comparison of each category, future studies should investigate their relevance and 
make comparisons. Construction of surveys could for instance test different dimensions on a 
greater scale.  
Survey studies could also be valuable with regard to the themes identified in the 
content analysis. Further research should investigate these themes in order to determine their 
relevance and whether they could be applied to future frameworks. 
This study had participants from captains, chief officers and second officers. The 
impression from the interviews was that these groups tend to reflect differently about the 
subject matter. The small number of participants in this study did not open up for comparison 
between groups. A suggestion for further studies would be to conduct more interviews and 
make group comparisons. This can for instance give valuable input for identifying specific 
training needs that for each group.  
Another direction for further studies is to look closer into the area of expertise. This 
study took an explorative approach of one framework that describe expert characteristics. It is 
critical to know what constitutes expert behavior before trying to measure expert 
performance. Shanteau’s (1992) framework was able to match some of the aspects in the 
maritime domain, and might be a good starting point for further research. There is a huge 
potential for the use of expert knowledge for further development. For instance, how could 
expertise be transferred to the design of a ship bridge, develop better automation systems or 
equipment, or how could we train for expert performance in complex maritime operations in 
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Conclusion 
This study shows that neither an individual centered approach (expertise) nor an 
organizational centered approach (safety climate) was able to account for the majority of 
statements expressing reflections about work practices in demanding maritime operations. A 
safety climate model combined with a model of expertise was able to account for a larger part 
of the statements than the models could separately, but fails to cover the whole picture in this 
study. The residual statements revealed several relevant themes related to how the crew 
perform they work and is a valuable source of information to further research. The results 
from this study demonstrate the complexity of assessing safety and performance in complex 
sociotechnical systems such as a marine vessel. Relying on insufficient frameworks when 
assessing the human element in complex work will leave the industry less capable to make the 
right adjustments in the future. This implies the need for more research to better understand 
the dynamic interactions between the factors that shape performance in demanding maritime 
operations.  
	   	   	  40	  
References Barnett,	  M.,	  Gatfield,	  D.,	  &	  Pekcan,	  C.	  (2003).	  Research	  agenda	  in	  maritime	  crew	  resource	  
management.	  Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Team	  Resource	  Management,	  Florida.	  	  	  Bjørkli,	  C.	  A.	  (2007).	  Joint	  cognitive	  systems	  at	  sea:	  A	  study	  of	  high-­speed	  craft	  operation.	  Doctoral,	  Norwegian	  University	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology,	  Trondheim.	  	  	  	   	  Bjørkli,	  C.	  A.,	  Røed,	  B.	  K.,	  Bjelland,	  H.	  V.,	  Gould,	  K.	  S.,	  &	  Hoff,	  T.	  (2007).	  Activity	  theory	  as	  a	  supportive	  framework	  in	  design	  of	  navigation	  equipment.	  Activités,	  4(1),	  179-­‐187.	  	   	  Braun,	  V.,	  &	  Clarke,	  V.	  (2006).	  Using	  thematic	  analysis	  in	  psychology.	  Qualitative	  
Research	  in	  Psychology,	  3,	  77-­‐101.	  	  	  Carayon,	  P.	  (2006).	  Human	  factors	  of	  complex	  sociotechnical	  systems.	  Applied	  
Ergonomics,	  37(4),	  525-­‐535.	  	   	  Cellier,	  J.	  M.,	  Eyrolle,	  H.,	  &	  Marine,	  C.	  (1997).	  Expertise	  in	  dynamic	  environments.	  
Ergonomics,	  40(1),	  28-­‐50.	  	   	  Charness,	  N.,	  &	  Tuffiash,	  M.	  (2008).	  The	  role	  of	  expertise	  research	  and	  human	  factors	  in	  capturing,	  explaining,	  and	  producing	  superior	  performance.	  Human	  Factors:	  The	  
Journal	  of	  the	  Human	  Factors	  and	  Ergonomics	  Society,	  50(3),	  427-­‐432.	  	   	  Chermack,	  T.	  J.,	  &	  Kasshanna,	  B.	  K.	  (2007).	  The	  use	  and	  misuse	  of	  swot	  analysis	  and	  implications	  for	  hrd	  professionals.	  Human	  Resource	  Development	  International,	  
10(4),	  383	  -­‐	  399.	  	   	  Clarke,	  C.,	  &	  Milne,	  R.	  (2001).	  National	  evaluation	  of	  the	  peace	  investigative	  interviewing	  course	  (pp.	  196):	  Home	  Office.	  Dekker,	  S.,	  &	  Hollnagel,	  E.	  (2004).	  Human	  factors	  and	  folk	  models.	  Cognition,	  Technology	  
&	  Work,	  6(2),	  79-­‐86.	  doi:	  10.1007/s10111-­‐003-­‐0136-­‐9	  Ericsson,	  K.	  A.	  (2006a).	  The	  influence	  of	  experience	  and	  deliberate	  practice	  on	  the	  development	  of	  superior	  expert	  performance.	  In	  K.	  A.	  Ericsson,	  N.	  Charness,	  P.	  J.	  Feltovich	  &	  R.	  R.	  Hoffman	  (Eds.),	  The	  cambridge	  handbook	  of	  expertise	  and	  expert	  
performance.	  New	  York:	  Camebridge	  University	  Press.	  Ericsson,	  K.	  A.	  (2006b).	  An	  introduction	  to	  cambridge	  handbook	  of	  expertise	  and	  expert	  performance:	  Its	  development,	  organization,	  and	  content.	  In	  K.	  A.	  Ericsson,	  N.	  
	   	   	  41	  
Charness,	  P.	  J.	  Feltovich	  &	  R.	  R.	  Hoffman	  (Eds.),	  The	  cambridge	  handbook	  of	  
expertise	  and	  expert	  performance.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Ericsson,	  K.	  A.,	  Charness,	  N.,	  Fetlovich,	  P.	  J.,	  &	  Hoffman,	  R.	  R.	  (2006).	  The	  cambridge	  
handbook	  of	  expertise	  and	  expert	  performance.	  New	  York:	  Combridge	  University	  Press.	  Farrington-­‐Darby,	  T.,	  &	  Wilson,	  J.	  (2006).	  The	  nature	  of	  expertise:	  A	  review.	  Applied	  
Ergonomics,	  37,	  17-­‐32.	  	   	  Flin,	  R.,	  Mearns,	  K.,	  O'Connor,	  P.,	  &	  Bryden,	  R.	  (2000).	  Measuring	  safety	  climate:	  Identifying	  the	  common	  features.	  Safety	  Science,	  34,	  177-­‐192.	  	   	  Forskningsrådet.	  (2010).	  Petromaks	  programplan:	  Program	  for	  optimal	  utnyttelse	  av	  norges	  petroliumsressurser.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://www.forskningsradet.no/servlet/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1226993690951&pagename=petromaks%2FHovedsidemal	   	  Gould,	  K.	  S.,	  Røed,	  B.	  K.,	  Koefoed,	  V.	  F.,	  Bridger,	  R.	  S.,	  &	  Moen,	  B.	  E.	  (2006).	  Performance-­‐shaping	  factors	  associated	  with	  navigation	  accidents	  in	  the	  royal	  norwegian	  army.	  Military	  Psychology,	  18,	  111-­‐129.	  	   	  Grenier,	  R.	  S.,	  &	  Kehrhahn,	  M.	  (2008).	  Toward	  an	  integrated	  model	  of	  expertise	  redevelopment	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  hrd.	  Human	  Resource	  Development	  
Review,	  7(2),	  198-­‐217.	  	   	  Gruber,	  H.	  (2001).	  Expertise,	  acquisition	  of.	  In	  J.	  S.	  Neil	  &	  B.	  B.	  Paul	  (Eds.),	  International	  
encyclopedia	  of	  the	  social	  &	  behavioral	  sciences	  (pp.	  5145-­‐5150).	  Oxford:	  Pergamon.	  Guldenmund,	  F.	  W.	  (2000).	  The	  nature	  of	  safety	  culture:	  A	  review	  of	  theory	  and	  research.	  Safety	  Science,	  34,	  215-­‐257.	  	   	  Guldenmund,	  F.	  W.	  (2007).	  The	  use	  of	  questionnaires	  in	  safety	  culture	  research	  –	  an	  evaluation.	  Safety	  Science,	  45(6),	  723-­‐743.	  	   	  Helms,	  M.	  M.,	  &	  Nixon,	  H.	  (2010).	  Exploring	  swot	  analysis	  -­‐	  where	  are	  we	  now?	  A	  review	  of	  academic	  research	  from	  the	  last	  decade.	  Journal	  of	  Strategy	  and	  Management,	  
3(3),	  215-­‐251.	  doi:	  10.1108/17554251011064837	  Hetherington,	  C.,	  Flin,	  R.,	  &	  Mearns,	  K.	  (2006).	  Safety	  in	  shipping:	  The	  human	  element.	  
Journal	  of	  Safety	  Research,	  37(4),	  401-­‐411.	  	   	  
	   	   	  42	  
Hoff,	  T.	  (2009).	  Mapping	  the	  organizational	  climate	  for	  innovation:	  Introducing	  swot	  as	  a	  process	  based	  tool.	  In	  W.	  Østreng	  (Ed.),	  Confluence.	  Interdisciplinary	  
communications	  2007/2008.	  Oslo:	  Centre	  for	  advanced	  study	  at	  the	  Norwegian	  academy	  of	  science	  and	  letters.	  Hoff,	  T.,	  Flakke,	  E.,	  Larsen,	  A.-­‐K.,	  Lone,	  J.	  A.,	  Bjørkli,	  C.	  A.,	  &	  Bjørklund,	  R.	  A.	  (2009).	  On	  the	  validity	  of	  m-­‐swot	  for	  innovation	  climate	  development.	  Scandinavian	  Journal	  of	  
organizational	  psychology,	  1(1),	  3-­‐11.	  	   	  Hoff,	  T.,	  Straumsheim,	  P.,	  Bjørkli,	  C.	  A.,	  &	  Bjørklund,	  R.	  A.	  (2009).	  An	  external	  validation	  of	  two	  psychosocial	  work	  environment	  surveys	  -­‐	  a	  swot	  approach.	  Scandinavian	  
Journal	  of	  organizational	  psychology,	  1,	  12-­‐19.	  	   	  Håvold,	  J.	  I.	  (2010).	  Safety	  culture	  and	  safety	  management	  aboard	  tankers.	  Reliability	  
Engineering	  &	  System	  Safety,	  95(5),	  511-­‐519.	  doi:	  10.1016/j.ress.2010.01.002	  IMO.	  (2010).	  The	  human	  element.	  Retrieved	  09.12.2010,	  2010,	  from	  http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/Pages/Default.aspx	  Imset,	  J.	  (2008).	  Assessing	  the	  “leading	  indicators”	  of	  safety	  climate	  in	  the	  shipping	  
industry.	  Master,	  University	  in	  Oslo,	  Oslo.	  	  	  	   	  Klein,	  G.	  A.	  (1998).	  Sources	  of	  power	  :	  How	  people	  make	  decisions	  London:	  MIT	  Press.	  Koester,	  T.	  (2001).	  Human	  factors	  and	  everyday	  routine	  in	  the	  maritime	  work	  domain.	  In	  D.	  d.	  Ward,	  K.	  Brookhuis,	  J.	  Moraal	  &	  A.	  Toffetti	  (Eds.),	  Human	  factors	  in	  
transportation,	  communication,	  health,	  and	  the	  workspace.	  Maastricht,	  the	  Netherlands:	  Shaker	  Publishing.	  Krippendorff,	  K.	  (2004).	  Content	  analysis:	  An	  introduction	  to	  its	  methodology	  (2nd	  ed.).	  Thousand	  Oaks:	  Sage	  Publications.	  Kvale,	  S.	  (1996).	  Interviews:	  An	  introduction	  to	  qualitative	  research	  interviewing.	  Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage.	  Landis,	  J.	  R.,	  &	  Koch,	  G.	  G.	  (1977).	  The	  measurement	  of	  observer	  agreement	  for	  categorical	  data.	  Biometrics,	  33(1),	  159-­‐174.	  	   	  Lützhöft,	  M.	  (2004).	  The	  technology	  is	  great	  when	  it	  works	  -­	  maritime	  technology	  and	  
human	  integration	  on	  the	  ship's	  bridge.	  	  Doctoral,	  University	  of	  Linköping,	  Linköping.	  	  	  	   	  
	   	   	  43	  
Maritim21.	  (2010).	  Maritim	  21:	  En	  helhetlig	  maritime	  forsknings-­‐	  og	  innovasjonssatsing.	  Trondheim:	  DNV.	  McGeorge,	  P.,	  Hands,	  D.,	  &	  Rugg,	  G.	  (1994).	  The	  contribution	  of	  knowledge	  acquisition	  techniques	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  training	  needs.	  Safety	  Science,	  18(2),	  79-­‐93.	  	  	  Morel,	  G.,	  Amalberti,	  R.,	  &	  Chauvin,	  C.	  (2008).	  Articulating	  the	  differences	  between	  safety	  and	  resilience:	  The	  decision-­‐making	  process	  of	  professional	  sea-­‐fishing	  skippers.	  
Human	  Factors:	  The	  Journal	  of	  the	  Human	  Factors	  and	  Ergonomics	  Society,	  50(1),	  1-­‐16.	  doi:	  10.1518/001872008x250683	  Norros,	  L.	  (2004).	  Acting	  under	  uncertainty.	  The	  core-­task	  analysis	  in	  ecological	  study	  of	  
work.	  Espoo:	  VVT	  publications.	  NOU.	  (2008:	  8).	  The	  loss	  of	  the	  "bourbon	  dolphin"	  on	  12	  april	  2007.	  	  Oslo:	  Government	  Administration	  Services.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/jd/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2008/bourbon.html?id=505100.	  Oltedal,	  H.,	  &	  Wadsworth,	  E.	  (2010).	  Risk	  perception	  in	  the	  norwegian	  shipping	  industry	  and	  identification	  of	  influencing	  factors.	  Maritime	  Policy	  &	  Management,	  37(6),	  601-­‐623.	  	   	  Perrow,	  C.	  (1986).	  Complex	  organizations:	  A	  critical	  essay.	  New	  York:	  McGraw-­‐Hill.	  Perrow,	  C.	  (1999).	  Normal	  accidents:	  Living	  with	  high-­risk	  technologies.	  Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  Rasmussen,	  J.	  (1997).	  Risk	  management	  in	  a	  dynamic	  society:	  A	  modelling	  problem.	  
Safety	  Science,	  27(2/3),	  183-­‐213.	  	   	  Robson,	  C.	  (2002).	  Real	  world	  research	  (2	  ed.).	  Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishing.	  Røed,	  B.	  K.	  (2007).	  Designing	  for	  high-­speed	  ships.	  Doctoral	  Norwegian	  University	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology,	  Trondheim.	  	  	  	   	  Salas,	  E.,	  Wilson,	  K.	  A.,	  Burke,	  C.	  S.,	  &	  Wightman,	  D.	  C.	  (2006).	  Does	  crew	  resource	  management	  training	  work?	  An	  update,	  an	  extension,	  and	  some	  critical	  needs.	  
Human	  Factors:	  The	  Journal	  of	  the	  Human	  Factors	  and	  Ergonomics	  Society,	  48(2),	  392-­‐412.	  	   	  
	   	   	  44	  
Salvesen,	  B.	  B.	  (2008).	  Managing	  risk	  in	  the	  shipping	  industry:	  Metodhological,	  theoretical	  
and	  applied	  implications	  for	  safety	  climate	  research.	  Master,	  University	  of	  Oslo,	  Oslo.	  	  	  	  	  Shanteau,	  J.	  (1992).	  The	  psychology	  of	  experts	  an	  alternative	  view.	  In	  G.	  Wright	  &	  F.	  Bolger	  (Eds.),	  Expertise	  and	  decision	  support.	  New	  York:	  Plenum	  Press.	  Trafford,	  S.	  M.	  (2009).	  Maritime	  safety:	  The	  human	  factors.	  Sussex:	  Book	  Guild	  Publishing.	  Vicente,	  K.	  J.	  (1999).	  Cognitive	  work	  analysis:	  Toward	  safe,	  productive,	  and	  healthy	  
computer-­based	  work.	  New	  Jersey:	  Lawrence	  Erlbaum	  Associates.	  Vicente,	  K.	  j.	  (2004).	  The	  human	  factor:	  Revolutionizing	  the	  way	  people	  live	  with	  
technology.	  New	  York:	  Routledge.	  Wichkens,	  C.	  D.,	  Lee,	  J.	  D.,	  Liu,	  Y.,	  &	  Becker,	  S.	  E.	  G.	  (2004).	  An	  introduction	  to	  human	  
factors	  engineering	  (Second	  ed.).	  London:	  Pearson	  Education	  International.	  Woods,	  D.	  D.	  (1998).	  Designs	  are	  hypothesis	  about	  how	  artifacts	  can	  shape	  cognition	  and	  collaboration.	  Ergonomics,	  41,	  168-­‐173.	  	   	  Woods,	  D.	  D.,	  &	  Dekker,	  S.	  (2000).	  Anticipating	  the	  effects	  of	  technological	  change:	  A	  new	  era	  of	  dynamics	  for	  human	  factors.	  Theoretical	  Issues	  in	  Ergonomics	  Science,	  1(3),	  272-­‐282.	  	   	  Woods,	  D.	  D.,	  &	  Hollnagel,	  E.	  (2006).	  Joint	  cognitive	  systems:	  Patterns	  in	  cognitive	  systems	  















	   	   	  46	  
Appendix B 
Information letter to participants 
Informasjon til deltakere i prosjektet EKMAR  - Ekspertise i krevende maritime operasjoner.  
Dette er et forskningsprosjekt ved Universitetet i Oslo (UiO) og Høgskolen i Vestfold (HiVE). Målet 
med prosjektet er å bedre forstå hva ekspertise er i krevende maritime operasjoner.  
Som datainnsamling i dette prosjektet foretar vi intervjuer med offiserer. Hensikten med intervjuet er å 
få et innblikk i hvordan erfarne offiserer tenker om sin måte å jobbe på i krevende operasjoner. Vi 
ønsker å få en bedre forståelse av ulike sider ved hvordan man jobber i og rundt krevende maritime 
operasjoner, og hvordan dette kan ha betydning for sikkerhet og effektiv drift.  
Det er ikke nødvendig med spesielle forberedelser før intervjuet, men det er fint om du kan lese 
gjennom og tenke litt på følgende to punkter:  
1) hva du mener kjennetegner krevende maritime operasjoner slik du ser det, og  
2) hva som kjennetegner din måte å jobbe på i og rundt slike operasjoner.  
Intervjuet kommer til å strukturere seg rundt hva som er styrker, svakheter, muligheter og trusler ved 
din måte å jobbe på i og rundt krevende maritime operasjoner. Tenk gjerne hvordan din tilnærming, 
eller måte å jobbe på er forskjellig fra for eksempel noen som er mindre erfaren, eller har ulik 
bakgrunn.  
Det er viktig å påpeke at dette ikke er en evaluering av personlige egenskaper eller prestasjoner. Det er 
heller ingen vurdering av prosedyrer. Vi er ute etter hva du tenker om krevende maritime operasjoner 
og hva du tenker om din måte å jobbe på i slike operasjoner. Hvis det er noe som er uklart eller om det 
er noe du lurer på underveis er det bare å stille spørsmål. 
Lengde på intervjuene 
Intervjuet tar omtrent 30 minutter.  
Opptak 
Vi ønsker å ta opp intervjuet på bånd for å sikre korrekt uthenting av informasjon. Opptaket vil ikke 
bli brukt i sin helhet, og vil slettes etter bruk.  
Dine rettigheter som deltaker i en vitenskapelig studie 
Du har til enhver tid mulighet til å trekke deg fra studien uten å oppgi noen grunn. All informasjon vil 
bli behandlet konfidensielt og alle som deltar vil bli anonymisert. Intervjuer, notater og annen 
dokumentasjon vil behandles og lagres i samsvar med retningslinjer fra Datatilsynet og 
forskningsetiske krav.  
Samtykke 
”Jeg har lest informasjonen ovenfor og er informert om mine rettigheter i en vitenskapelig studie”: 
 
Signatur: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Har du spørsmål eller ønsker mer informasjon kan du ta kontakt med Georg Giskegjerde (UiO) på 
georggi@student.uio.no, eller telefon 97 01 06 64.  
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  APPENDIX	  C	  Unitizing	  instructions:	  defining	  a	  statement	  
What	  is	  a	  statement?	  -­‐ A	  statement	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  (smallest)	  meaningful	  part	  of	  a	  sentence,	  a	  whole	  sentence	  or	  several	  sentences	  that	  reflects	  the	  informants	  experience	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  topic	  of	  interest.	  	  -­‐ A	  statement	  is	  the	  informant’s	  reflection	  to	  the	  interviewers	  questions	  and	  topic	  of	  interest	  independent	  of	  any	  models	  and	  theories	  about	  the	  topic.	  	  -­‐ A	  statement	  should	  be,	  to	  the	  extent	  possible,	  be	  comprehensible	  by	  itself	  and	  contain	  only	  one	  piece	  of	  information,	  idea	  or	  evaluation.	  	  -­‐ Sentences	  or	  paragraphs	  that	  contain	  several	  statements	  (information	  units)	  should	  be	  marked	  as	  several	  statements	  even	  if	  these	  statement	  contains	  only	  a	  single	  word.	  If	  the	  single	  word	  is	  not	  comprehensible	  by	  itself	  the	  context	  will	  define	  the	  meaning.	  	  
o Ex:	  “It	  is	  important	  to	  have	  physical	  strength,	  mental	  abilities	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  
knowledge	  to	  be	  able	  to	  work	  at	  sea”	  	  The	  following	  is	  a	  statement:	  	  
 1)	  It	  is	  important	  to	  have	  “Physical	  strength”	  
 2)	  mental	  abilities	  
 3)	  lot	  of	  knowledge,	  	  to	  be	  able	  to	  work	  at	  sea.	  In	  other	  words:	  three	  statements.	  	  The	  context:	  “It	  is	  important	  to…	  “and	  “to	  be	  
able	  to	  work	  at	  sea”	  gives	  the	  statements	  meaning,	  and	  will	  be	  included	  in	  the	  coding	  process.	  	  	  -­‐ By	  including	  the	  interviewers	  question	  or	  text	  before	  or	  after	  the	  actual	  statement	  (idea,	  information),	  the	  statement	  gets	  the	  sufficient	  semantic	  meaning.	  
o Example:	  If	  someone	  says	  “self-­‐confidence”,	  it	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  statement,	  but	  include	  necessary	  context	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  statement	  comprehensible	  on	  its	  own	  (for	  instance:	  “Q:	  what	  is	  important	  for	  you?	  A:	  self-­‐confidence”)	  	  	  
The	  boundaries	  of	  a	  statement	  -­‐ Physical	  length,	  paragraphs,	  the	  number	  of	  words	  or	  even	  number	  of	  sentences	  does	  not	  define	  the	  length	  of	  a	  statement.	  The	  start	  and	  ending	  of	  a	  statement	  is	  dependent	  on	  its	  content	  and	  the	  context.	  It	  is	  considered	  a	  new	  statement	  if	  it	  changes	  to	  a	  new	  piece	  of	  information	  or	  idea	  that	  can	  be	  related	  to	  the	  topic	  and	  question,	  as	  described	  above.	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  -­‐ The	  informant	  often	  gives	  elaborations	  and	  examples.	  This	  can	  be	  interesting	  information,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  a	  statement	  as	  such.	  The	  important	  thing	  is	  that	  if	  elaborations	  include	  a	  point	  that	  is	  considered	  a	  new	  piece	  of	  information	  different	  from	  the	  previous,	  then	  this	  should	  be	  marked	  as	  a	  new	  statement.	  	  
Procedure:	  The	  interview	  is	  transcribed	  more	  or	  less	  literally	  from	  a	  tape	  recorder	  and	  is	  therefore	  presented	  the	  same	  way	  an	  informant	  would	  naturally	  talk	  about	  the	  subject	  matter.	  This	  makes	  it	  challenging	  to	  identify	  statements	  because	  natural	  speech	  is	  not	  always	  as	  straightforward	  as	  written	  texts.	  If	  in	  doubt	  of	  the	  meaning,	  make	  a	  note	  in	  the	  text.	  Open	  the	  interview	  in	  a	  word	  processing	  program.	  As	  you	  identify	  a	  statement,	  mark	  each	  statement	  with	  a	  colour	  (for	  instance	  yellow	  and	  green)	  to	  ensure	  control	  over	  what	  is	  coded	  or	  not.	  	  Write	  down	  any	  notes	  that	  might	  come	  useful	  for	  further	  analysis.	  	  
 
 	  
